Apple Inc. and Nokia used two different business models to achieve phenomenal success in the handset vendor marketplace. Apples iPhone is unique, affordable, captures the imagination, and translates the resultant overwhelming global sales and deals into market share and miraculous profits. Apples eccentric CEO allows rumors to leak to mainstream and industry media which incite sales booms. On the other hand, Nokia succeeded with low-key, persistent innovation, branding, marketing and manufacturing, in a long, well-founded march from its home market advantage into the global market. Apple achieved a clean sweep of the markets mindshare with its single iPhone product. On the other hand, Nokia has achieved a runaway handset market share of almost 40 percent in the past several years, based on a thousand different products for a thousand different global markets, geographies, cultures and price points. Mindshare likely leads to market share, but market share may or may not capture mindshare, and its probably wise to pursue both. For better or for worse consumer-wise, Apple employs an exclusionary closed loop of device-and-content business model, whereas Nokia is building a more open model, to generate a software-driven stream of renewable revenue from the Internet. Apples flexible platform just upgraded iPhone to 16 GB and added features pleasing to enterprise IT managers. A software developers kit (SDK) invites third-party iPhone applications. On the other hand, U.S. markets continue to favor Nokias open-access networks. Although not having a current presence in the U.S. market, Nokia holds 70 percent market share in India, as well as large market shares in Europe and parts of Asia. Nokias success in the U.S. will require a licensing agreement with Qualcomm, and partnerships with Vodafone and its subsidiary Verizon Wireless.